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SYMPOSIUM
A DUTY TO REPRESENT? CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON STROPNICKY v.
NATHANSON
FOREWORD: OF LEGAL ETHICS, TAXIS,
AND DOING THE RIGHT THING
MARTHA MINOW*

When Judith Nathanson, an attorney, declined Joseph
Stropnicky's request for legal representation in a divorce, she took
a stand. She asserted her commitment to representing only women
in divorces. Nathanson could have simply said she was too busy, or
she did not like Stropnicky's tone of voice, or otherwise tried to
duck the case. By indicating instead a considered judgment against
representing men, Nathanson opened herself up to a charge of sex
discrimination. Stropnicky made that charge, and won before the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD").1
The editors of this journal have responded by taking their own
stand. They do not advocate one side in the case, or even one
strand of argument or issue. But by devoting a symposium issue to
the case, they expend their most valuable resource, their pages, on
the conviction that the case and the issues it raises are worth your
most valuable resource, your time. I think they are right.
As the fascinating and thoughtful symposium contributions in
dicate, the case raises many issues about the current and potential
scope and definition of illicit sex discrimination,2 the reach of con
stitutional freedom of speech and freedom of association defenses?
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See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25,
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2. See Joan Mahoney, Using Gender as a Basis of Client Selection: A Feminist
Perspective, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 79 (1998); Sam Stonefield, Lawyer Discrimination
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3. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998); Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers'
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the special demands of civil rights lawyering,4 the aspirations and
realities of legal work,s and the significance of the individual per
son's identity, beliefs, reputation, and sheer embodiment in the acts
of legal representation. 6 It might initially seem that the presenta
tion of the issues is imbalanced, given the presence of only one con
tribution that expressly supports sanctions against Judith
Nathanson? Yet, the numerous contributions defending Nathanson
raise and develop arguments against the current law, summarized in
the decision of the MeAD to sanction Nathanson. In addition, the
sheer variety of argument proffered on Nathanson's behalf in this
symposium should not be understood as overwhelming evidence
that she was right. Instead, that variety may indicate the basic diffi
culty in articulating one knock-out argument on her behalf.
That said, I share the view taken by most of the contributors
here that as a matter of law, Nathanson should be allowed to tum
down Stropnicky based on her commitment to eradicate gender
bias in the realm of divorce law. The seemingly varied arguments
grounded in statutory construction, freedoms of speech and associa
tion, a plethora of analogies,8 and assessments of what makes law
yers effective converge9 around a central idea: Lawyers bring too
much of their own selves to the task of lawyering to be compelled
to represent any particular individual. Lawyers are not like taxi
drivers who must take all comers because lawyers transport clients
with their words, reputations, and personal credibility, not with a
standard-issue vehicle. Moreover, any other rule will simply lead to
less honest (but perfectly lawful) rejections than the one Nathanson
gave to Stropnicky. So any other result would promote lies by law
yers (not exactly what the world needs) and probably insurmounta
ble enforcement difficulties. In discussing the legality of client
Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanc
tioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 93 (1998).
4. See James A. Gardner, Section 98 and the Specialized Practice of Civil Rights
Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 39 (1998).
5. See Terri R. Day & Scott L. Rogers, When Principled Representation Tests
Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 23 (1998).
6. See Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 9 (1998); Chris K. Iijima, When Fiction Intrudes upon Reality: A
Brief Reply to Professor Chin, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73 (1998). All of the articles in
the symposium deal to some degree with the issues affecting the place of an individual's
identity and belief in the practice of law.
7. See Stonefield, supra note 2, at 136.
8. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 99.
9. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 6, at 14-15 (arguing that a lawyer who is forced to
represent a particular client is unlikely to do a sufficient job).
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rejection, I mean here only to raise your curiosity, not to end con
sideration of the legality of the matter. Read the contributions to
the symposium, and the MCAD decision; judge for yourself.
Yet having concluded, for myself, that Nathanson and other
lawyers should have the ability to select and reject clients based on
political visions and personal commitments, I also think that Na
thanson made a mistake in rejecting Stropnicky. I base this on a
friendly interpretation of, or if necessary, amendment to Nathan
son's own asserted commitments to end gender bias in divorce. Na
thanson's view, which I share, is that women's historic roles in the
family and the labor market place them at a disadvantage in the
dissolution of marriage under both traditional rules and emerging
rules that favor gender neutrality. Traditional rules explicitly con
fined women's claims to property division and custody to their
subordinate status in the family and in the workplace. Current
rules claiming gender neutrality devalue the disproportionate con
tribution most women make to making a home and taking care of
children while also leaving women to the still-unequal opportunities
in the labor market. 1O
Notice, however, how I felt compelled to write "most women"
in the last sentence. It just is not true that all women do the home
making and childcare in all families. To talk or think otherwise is to
make the same mistake of equating actual individuals with predom
inant patterns that has generated and perpetuated gender stereo
types and disadvantages through time. It is inaccurate and
potentially harmful to human freedom to use the short-hand of
"women" when we actually mean individuals who suffer from the
confines of a homemaking and child rearing role without receiving
adequate monetary or other compensation for their work. That is
the mistake that feminist theorists have called "essentializing gen
der."ll A strong point of the anti-pornography ordinance drafted
and unsuccessfully defended by Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin is its intended protection for men put in the position tradi
tionally occupied by women. 12
Mr. Stropnicky at least claimed that he fell in the position tra
ditionally occupied by women in marriage. He stayed at home, out
10.

See

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE

4 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
12. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20
HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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of the economic market; he cared for the house and children. Per
haps these were not accurate claims. Perhaps he could pursue eco
nomic opportunities after divorce that would not be open to most
women. Either of these possibilities would distinguish his situation
from the position of subordination, the traditional female position
in marriage, that characterizes Nathanson's concerns in her divorce
practice, and specific conclusions about them could well justify re
jecting his request for representation. Yet failing to pursue his re
quest to the point of specific conclusions, and treating him as simply
beyond her scope of concern because of his sex and gender, makes
the mistake of essentializing gender. . Nathanson should have the
right to make the mistake, but I think she, and other feminist law
yers can do better.
But what will endure about this case, even after all appeals are
exhausted, is not a judgment about the wisdom of her choice or
even, perhaps, its legality. What will endure, I hope, is heightened
reflection about the obligations and demands of lawyering. We are
indeed persons when we provide legal services, and our very per
sonhood is crucial to both the appearance and reality of legal work.
Our beliefs, our words, our genders, races, and reputations infuse,
enable and limit what we can offer those in need of legal help. We
sometimes do and always should be able to marshal our very selves
as lawyers on behalf of causes. That doing so will on occasion pro
duce hard personal and professional choices should make us act
with care, and attention to the particular and long-term conse
quences of our actions.

